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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN D. GLYNN,
Plaintiff ~and A'ppellant,
vs.
MARJORIE DOCTORMAN
DUBIN, aka MARJORIE
DOCTORMAN and DESERET
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN AS'SOCIATI 0N, a
corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

C
ase No. 9388

1

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF
JOHN D. GLYNN, Plaintiff 'and Appellant in
the above entitled matter, appearing in propria persona, pursuant to Rule '76(e) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, respectfully petitions this Honorable
Court for a rehearing in the above entitled cause
upon the following grounds:
1. The decision of the Supreme Court is erroneous in that the necessary effect of such decision
is to deprive plaintiff-appellant of his property
without due process of law contrary to the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
2. In addition to a denial of due process of
1
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law, the force and effect of the decision of the
Supreme Court is to render void or abrogate Section 30-4-4 of Utah Code Annotated, 19'53.
3. The force and effect of the decision of the
Supreme Court is to render void Sec. 25-1-8 of Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, and to void 'any contract or
conveyance effecting property mentioned in the petition made by either party to an action for divorce
or separate maintenance irrespective of whether
or not such contract or conveyance is bona fide, for
consideration and not subject to attack under the
Fraudulent ·Conveyance Act, 25-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Appellant requests
that a relhearing be granted, that the Court re-examine the facts and the l'aw and that the judgment
of the trial court be reversed with judgment in
favor of plaintiff-appellant for partition of real
property and for an accounting of rental income.
Since defendant-respondent stated that she was satisfied with the evidence on her counter-claim (T.R~
p. 35) no useful purpose would be served by a retrial and the judgment should be reversed forthwith.
JOHN D. GLYNN
In Propria Persona
9171 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California
2
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CERTIFICATE OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT APPEARING
IN PROPRIA PERSONA
I hereby certify that I am appearing in propria
persona herein and that in my opinion there is good
cause to believe the judgment objected to is erroneous
and th·at the case ought to be re-examined as prayed
in the Petition, and that this Petition is not filed
for the purpose of delay or to otherwise hinder the
prosecution of this action.

JOHN D. GLYNN
In Propria Persona
9171 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IS
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THE NECESSARY EFFECT
OF SUCH DECISION IS TO DEPRIVE ·P·LAINTIFFAPPELLANT OF HIS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW CONTRARY TO THE 14T·H AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.

·The opinion of the Supreme Court fails to discuss or ·answer any of the 'Points on Appeal set forth
in Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief and the opinion fails
to cite ~any case or statutory authority in support
of its reaJsoning or decision. The opinion of the Supreme Court does not rest on the findings or conclusions of the trial court but instead rests on its
own conclusions without regard to the findings of
the trial court or the deficiencies of the findings or
conclusion·s made by the trial court.
The force and effect of the decision of the Supreme Court is to deprive Plaintiff-Appellant of his
property without due process of law contrary to the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. This denial of due process first flows from
and arises out of the decision of the Supreme Court.
It is not disputed that on December 7, 1959-,
Dr. Martin F. Dubin executed in favor of Plaintiff4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant a quitclaim deed of his interest in the
property which is the subject matter of the instant
action, and that said deed was recorded on S'aid
date. It is also not disputed that on said date Pl'aintiff-Appellant in consideration of the execution of
said deed paid Dr. Dubin the sum of $100.00, executed a promissory note in Dr. Dubin's favor for
$5,000.00, and cancelled legal fees owing to Plaintiff-Appellant in the amount of $3,000.00. It is also
not disputed th·at a like quitclaim deed was executed
by Dr. Dubin in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant on
December 8, 1959. Further, there is no dispute that
the action pending on December 7, 1959, between
Dr. Dubin and his wife was dismissed on December
8, 1959. Importantly, there is no di spute that Plaintiff-Appellant was not named as a party to either
the suit pending on December 7, 1959, or to the suit
filed on December ~8, 1959. Plaintiff-Appellant was
not served with process either personally or construtively as to either suit, nor was Dr. Dubin restrained
by court order from disposing of or encumbering the
property held in joint tenancy as is provided in an
action for separate m·aintenance by Section 30-4-4,
Utah Code Annotated 1H53. Plaintiff-Appellant was
not advised by any means that his rights under either
the deed of December 7, 1959, or December 8, 1959
would be determined at the hearing or trial of the
action filed on December 8, 1959.
1

5
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Defendant- Respondent Marjorie Doctorm'an
Dubin admitted in her pleadings to the instant action by Plaintiff-Appellant that he stated a cause
of action for partition of real property. Apparently,
the position of Defendant-Respondent was th'at t'he
deeds were void under the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-8.
However, the decision of the Supreme ·Court does
not discuss the serious deficiencies in the findings
of the trial court on this theory, but rather the decision holds that since Plaintiff-Appellant knew of
the action for separate maintenance (improperly
amended to 'an action for divorce) that under no
circumstances could Dr. Dubin convey any interest
in the property not subject to divestment, irrespective of whether or not such conveyance was made
in good faith and not fraudulently under Section
25-1-8 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The main point of the instant petition for rehearing is that Plaintiff-Appellant has been denied
due process of l·aw. The Supreme Court of the United
States ·has decided many cases in which the question
was whether or not the type of notice given to a
party to ~an action was sufficient to constitute due
process of law. In the instant case Plaintiff-Appellant w.as not .a party to either of s·aid actions and
w.as not given any notice that his rights under his
deed were to be determined by either of said actions.
6
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At the trial of the action filed December 8, 1959,
no mention was made to the court by DefendantRespondent of the fact that the instant PlaintiffAppell'ant had been conveyed Dr. Dubin's interest
even though she and her two counsel personally
knew of said fact. This is borne out by the transcript of record of said trial which is an exhibit to
the instant action. The United States Supreme Court
has stated in Mtttllane v. Centr.al Hanover B~ank &
Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314, 315, 94 L.Ed. 865,
873, 87 4, 70 S. Ct. 652; Covey v. Somers, 351 U. S.
141, 146, 100 L.Ed. 1021, 76 S. Ct. 724:
"An elemental land fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections . . . when notice
is a person's due, process which is a mere
gesture is not due process. The me'ans employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to ·accomplish it.
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.
Grannis v. Orde,an, 234 U. S. 385, 394, 58
L.Ed. 1363, 1368, 34 S. Ct. 779. This right to
be heard has little re~ality or worth unless one
is informed that the matter is pending and
can choose for himself whether to appear or
default, acqtttiesce or contest." (Emphasis
supplied)
7
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In Grannis v. Ordean, ·34 S. Ct. 779, 234 U. S.
38'5, 58 L.Ed. 1363, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
"If in the action the court has jurisdiction over the res the judgment in order to be
binding with respect to the interest of a nonresident who is not served with process within
the state, must be ·based upon constructive
notice given by publication, mailing, or otherwise, substantially in the manner prescribed
by the law of the state."
In Griffen v. Griffen, 66 S. Ct. 5'56, 32'7, U. S.
220, 90 L.Ed. 635 it was held that:
"Due process forbids any exercise of
judicial power substantially affecting a defendant's rights without notice."
The court also stated that "Notice by personal
or substituted service cannot, consistently with due
p·rocess, be dispensed with, even in the case of judgment in rem with respect to property within the
jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment."
In Hansberry v. Lee, 61 S. Ct. 115, 311 U. S.
32, 85 L.Ed. 22, 132 ALR 741 it was specifically
held that the enforcement of a judgment against the
person or property of one not designated as a party
nor made a party by service of process violates the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In State of Missuori ex rei Hurwitz v.
North, 46 S. Ct. 384, 271 U. S. 40, 70 L.Ed. 818
it was held that notice of suit and opportunity for
8
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hearing are requisites of due process. See also:
Lambert v. People of the State of California, 78 S.
Ct. 240, 355 U. S. 225; Shelly v. Kraemer, 68 S. Ct.
836, 334 U. S. 1, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 3 ALR 2d 441.
In the instant case the judgment of the Utah
Supreme Court could not have been given without
depriving Plaintiff-Appellant of due process of l~aw.
The basi's of the Court's opinion was to hold that
the judgment rendered by the trial court in the action filed on December 8, 1959 determined the instant Plaintiff-Appellant's rights even though the
instant Plaintiff-Appellant w~as not named ~as a
party in said suit, was not served personally or con-structively with service of process and the deed under
'\Vhich the instant Plaintiff-Appellant claims his
rights was not mentioned in the pleadings nor at
the time of trial even though the existence of such
deed was known at the time of filing of the action
and tri'al thereof by the instant Defendant-Respondent and her two counsel. Under Utah law, the instant Defendant- Respondent could have made the
instant Plaintiff-Appellant a party to her action
filed on December 8, 19"59, but she did not choose to
do so and to permit her now to use the decision in
that action to deprive Plaintiff-Appell'ant of his property is a flagrant violation of due process of law.
9
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POINT II
IN ADDITION TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW, THE FORCE AND EFFECT 'OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IS TO RENDER
VOID OR ABROGATE SECTION 30-4-4 OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states that
the original action for separate maintenance placed
the property within the jurisdiction of the court and
th'at ''Dr. Dubin could not make any conveyance
thereof except subject to adjudication by the court."
This is contrary to Section 30-4-4 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Utah cases of Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544, 188 Pac. 6'3'5 and Nielson v. Nie~
son, 30 Utah 3'91, 85 Pac. 429, and cases and authorities from other jurisdictions cited in Appellant's
Brief at pages 23, 24, 25 and 27 through 3'4.
Section 30-4-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
specifically provides that in an action for separate
maintenance the plaintiff in such action may procure from the court an order enjoining and restraining the defendant from disposing of or encumbering real property involved in such action and that
when the order is filed with the county recorder
where the property is located "from the time of filing such order the property described shall be charged with a lien in favor of plaintiff to the extent of
any judgment which may be rendered in the action".
It is obvious that the Utah legisl'ature has de-

to
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termined that until such time that a court order
is obtained and filed with the county recorder that
there cannot be a lien created as to the property
in question. In the instant case no such order was
obtained. A lis pendens does not take the place of
such order. The effect of the Supreme Court's
opinion is to render void or ~abrogate the legislative
enactment and to create a lien merely upon the
filing of a petition for separate mainten,ance. This
the Court cannot do since there is no ambiguity or
defect in the code section which can possibly support the statutory construction inherent in the
Court's opinion. In fact, the force and effect of the
Court's opinion is to render useless or as an idle
act the filing of 'a lis pendens since the Court states
that any conveyance may be held to be invalid irrespective of whether or not such conveyance was bona
fide and not in violation of the Fraudulent Conveynace Act, Section 25-1-8, Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
It is important to note that the deed executed
by Dr. Dubin on December 7, '1959, in favor of
Pl'aintiff-Appellant was delivered and recorded on
said date and prior to the action filed on December
8, 1959, or the lis pendens filed on said date. The
Court's opinion fails to state how Plaintiff-Appellant's rights under the deed of December 7, 1959,
could be effected by a later filed action against Dr.
11
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Dubin who at the time of the filing of said action
h'ad previously conveyed his interest in the property
to Plaintiff-Appellant.
POINT III
THE FORCE AND EFFE'CT OF THE DECISION
OF THE su~PREIME co·uRT Is TO RENDER voiD
SECTION 25-1-8 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953,
AND TO RENDER VOID ANY CONTRACT OR CONVEYAN·CE AFFECTING PROPERTY MENTl'ONE'D IN
THE PETITION MADE BY EITHER PARTY TO AN
ACTION FOR DIVORCE OR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE IRRES'PECTIVE OF W·HETHER OR NOT SUCII
CONTRACT OR CONVEYANCE IS BONA FIDE, F·OR
CONSIDERATION AND N·OT SUBJECT TO ATTACK
UNDER THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT,
SECTION 25-1-8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

The decision in the instant case rendered by
the Supreme Court is contrary to and overrules
Adamson v. Adamson, Utah, 55 Utah 544, 188 Pac.
635 and Nielson v. Nielson, 30 Utah 391, 85 Pac.
429. Said decision is also contrary to cases -and
authorities cited in Appellant's Brief pages 27
through 34. Importantly, it is to be noted that nowhere in the Court's oinion is there any indication
that the conveyances made by Dr. Dubin to PlaintiffAppellant were fraudulent within the requirements
of Section 25-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. App·arently, the Court did not care to discuss this point
since to do so would have necessitated an examination of the serious defects in the findings to enable
said code section to be applicable. Rather, the Court
12
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completely ignored the pleadings in the action and
determined that because Pl'aintiff-Appellant knew
of the two actions he could not receive ·any conveyance which would not be subject to divestment by
adjudication by the Court. As Plaintiff-Appellant
has heretofore stated in this brief said conclusion
is contrary to the explicit terms of Section 30-4-4,
Utah Code Annotated, 19'53. The force and effect
of the Court's decision is either to create by "judicial
legisl'ation" an unwarranted expansion of the scope
of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act or to nullify
said code section. The court by its decision h·as disabled civilly either party to a divorce or separate
maintenan·ce action from making ·any contract or
conveyance affecting property described in the petition to 'anyone aware of the action even though such
contract or conveyance be bona fide, made in the
utmost good faith and not in any respects fraudulent. This not the law in any other state. It has not
been the law in Utah. In Adamson v. Adamson, Utah,
55 Utah 544, 188 Pac. 635, a divorce action, the
grantee (father of the husband) knew of the action
and purchased one half of the property from his
son. The court upheld the conveyance. In Nielson
v. Nielson, 30 Utah 391, 85 Pac. 429, it was held
that the husband in a divorce action had a right to
sell his interest in the property subject only to his
'vife's one third interest in case she continued to
13
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be his wife and survived him. See also Sun Insurance Co. v. White, 123 C. 196, 55 P. 902, where a
conveyance was upheld in an action in which a lis
pendens was filed and in which the plaintiff grantee
had actual notice of the divorce action. The court
in the instant case has failed to discuss or distinguish the series of cases cited in Appellant's
Brief, pages 28 through 34, in which conveyances
made to the husband's attorney in a divorce action
were held to be as valid as any other conveyance
made for valuable consideration and without intent
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or other persons. The Court has, in effect, rendered void the
Fraudulent Conveyance Act or failed to apply it ahd
has stated that if an action for divorce or separate
maintenance is filed that any conveyance made may
be held to be invalid, and it is immaterial that: (1)
there was a valuable and fair consideration for the
transfer, (2) there was no fraudulent intent by the
grantor, ('3) there Was no knowledge by the grantee
of any fraudulent intent of his grantor, or ( 4) that
the wife may or may not be a '·'creditor" or "other
person" under the statute.

14
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted th'at on the law
and the facts, the decision of the trial court should
be reversed with judgment in favor of PlaintiffAppellant for partition of real property, and for an
accounting of rental income. Since Defendant-Respondent stated that she was satisfied with the evidence on her counter-claim (T.R. p. 35) no useful
purpose would be served by a retrial and the judgment should be reversed forthwith.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN D. GLYNN
In Propria Persona
9171 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California
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